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ABSTRACT

Due to the devastating global impact that infectious diseases have had, especially
in developing countries, the demand for access to adequate resources to combat sickness
continues to be a heavy burden. Reliable and affordable diagnostics is a vital first line of
defense in fighting outbreaks and providing accurate treatment. Digital microfluidics
biochips capable of running multiple diagnostic tests on a single platform are an
emerging technology that are increasingly being evaluated as a viable platform for rapid
diagnosis and point-of-care field deployment. Although these systems offer many
benefits, processing errors are inherent. Therefore, cyber-physical digital biochips are
being investigated that offer higher reliability through the inclusion of automated error
recovery mechanisms that can reconfigure the electrode array at runtime. These
mechanisms allow additional fluid handling operations to be re-executed if issues occur.
Despite these advantages, there are risks. Recent research has begun to explore security
vulnerabilities of digital microfluidic systems that could negatively impact accurate test
reporting. In this work the Multiple Security Domain Nondeducibility (MSDND)
framework is used to explore Stuxnet-type vulnerabilities that exist due to implicit trust
in cyber-physical monitors. This thesis proposes a methodology for detecting such realtime attacks against cyber-physical digital microfluidic systems using physical attestation
of biochemical processes to create beneficial information flow paths.
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1. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the importance and potential of Lab-on-Chip (LOC) technology
and micro-Total-Analysis-Systems (µTAS) has grown with the increasing need to
perform diagnostics outside of a laboratory domain. Advances in micro/nano-fabrication
have facilitated the performance of laboratory processes onto a single device. µTAS
extends these capabilities even further by including chemical analysis with the goal of
creating “Sample-In, Answer-Out” platforms. Such technologies can be instrumental in
point-of-care (POC) environments that aim to shift diagnosis and monitoring from
traditional clinical treatment settings to patient bedside. Digital microfluidics biochips
(DMFB) are an emerging LOC technology that are increasingly being evaluated as a
viable platform for rapid diagnosis and point-of-care field deployment. In such a
technology, processing errors are inherent. Therefore, monitoring biochemical reactions
during assay execution is essential. The integration of sensors into the system becomes
necessary to enable physical-aware systems. This makes detection of these errors
possible and increases system reliability. Recent advances in cyber-physical digital
biochips offer this higher reliability through the inclusion of automated error recovery
mechanisms that reconfigure electrode array programming in response to real-time
operational errors.
Although the benefits of cyber-physical DMFB is clear, research scrutinizing its
security implications has remained largely unexplored until recent years. The potential
exists for attacks on these systems to result in false diagnosis or platform damage. Recent
research has begun to explore security vulnerabilities of digital microfluidic systems. In
this work we use the Multiple Security Domain Nondeducibility (MSDND) framework

2
[4] to explore vulnerabilities that exist due to implicit trust. Specifically, we examine
Stuxnet-type threats [9] that result in the disruption of information flow paths, and how
creating beneficial paths will prevent threats from “hiding” behind nondeducibility.

3
2. FOUNDATIONAL WORK

2.1. OVERVIEW OF DIGITAL MICROFLUIDIC BIOCHIPS
Microfluidics [3] is the science of precisely controlling and manipulating
the transport of small fluid volumes, typically from microliters to picoliters, for use in a
wide range of mission-critical applications such as DNA sequencing, immunoassays,
bioterrorism protection. Currently, common use cases represent biochemical applications
that allow scientists to analyze larger numbers of sample fluids quickly and with few
resources. In addition to the reduction of resources required for analysis, microfluidic
devices allow for precise control of reactions which enhances accuracy. To enable such
use cases, multiple disciplines, such as engineering, physics, chemistry, and
nanotechnology intersect to develop microfluidic biochips that act as miniaturized
laboratories that perform these experiments. Microfluidic biochips can be primarily
divided into two categories: continuous flow and digital devices. Continuous flow
microfluidic biochips are fabricated using microchannels, pumps and valves. Fluids
driven through these channels frequently depend on sources such as external or internal
pumps. Additional drive sources can include capillary forces and electrokinetic
mechanisms depending up the application. Since their infancy, continuous flow
topologies have progressed from containing only a few microchannels to complex,
commercially developed devices which contain large scale channel networks that can
perform a series of distinct analysis. Despite these advantages, continuous flow
microfluidic systems also have the limitations in the following areas: scalability, reconfigurability, and fault tolerance. Continuous flow biochips have been shown to be
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inherently difficult to scale down because each device within the system has a decisive
impact on system performance. Secondly, continuous flow devices do not provide for
configuration after fabrication. When the device is fabricated, the channels are
predetermined and permanently etched in the substrate leaving no option for
reconfiguration. The third challenge is that continuous flow biochips lack fault tolerance.
If any channel or other chip device is non-functional or defective then the entire system is
non-functional.
Digital microfluidic biochips represent a promising alternative that addresses the
shortcomings of continuous microfluidic biochips. Digital, or droplet-based, microfluidic
devices involves the transport of a set of droplets over a microarray of discrete electrodes
under clock control. Figure 2.1 shows a cell cross-sectional representation and a parallel
plate 2D microarray electrode implementation:

Figure 2.1. Cross section of digital microfluidic biochip cell [22]

Figure 2.1 displays a common device implementation which consists in parallel
substrates that contain and control the droplet(s) to be transported. The top plate contains
only a single ground electrode while the bottom substrate holds a 2-dimensional array of
control electrodes. To facilitate transport, the voltage of the control electrodes are turned
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on/off at select times which provoke drop motion across the surface of the array. Figure
2.2 gives a simple illustration of droplet motion control:

Figure 2.2. Droplet motion control [22]

On the left in Figure 2.2, the droplet is centered over control electrode 2 (CE2),
and overlaps with adjacent electrodes CE1 and CE3. At the “initial” time CE2 is
activated as represented in white while the neighboring electrodes are in a deactivated
state as represented in black. In the following time step CE3 is activated by applying a
control voltage to the electrode which induces a change to the electric field resulting in
a phenomenon known as electrowetting that stretches the droplet over the activated
electrode . Deactivating CE2 as shown on the far right allows the droplet to center
on the one remaining activated control electrode. Founded on the principle of
electrowetting, digital microfluidic biochips can perform a set of basic operations that
lend themselves to the execution of highly-complex biochemical processes. The five
fundamental operations that form the instruction set are: transport, split, merge, mix, and
store. Figure 2.3 illustrates these operations on microarray segments:
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Figure 2.3. Five basic digital microfluidic operations [22]

Transport involves the transfer of a single droplet from one electrode to an
adjacent cell. Splitting is the division of a single droplet into two droplets of possibly
different sizes and concentrations. This occurs when a droplet is resting on a
deactivated cell and two adjacent cells are activated which causes the droplet to be
divided into separate parts and moved toward the neighboring cells. Merging is the
combination of multiple droplets of possibly different sizes and concentrations into a
single droplet. Mixing is the process of combing analytes, which are samples under
test, with reagent. This occurs when a droplet is transported across a selected array
segment to intersect with a reagent. Droplet storage results from the deactivation of
surrounding cells and activating the cell where the droplet rests. An additional fluidic
operation that is often used, but not represented in Figure 2.3 is dispensing. Droplet
dispensing refers to the process of extracting a smaller volume of fluid from a larger
volume of liquid into smaller unit droplets for manipulation. As will be elaborated in
the following subsections, the composition of these basic operations addresses the
shortcomings of continuous flow devices by improving scalability, permitting
reconfigurability, and enabling fault tolerance. The next subsection gives a more
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thorough treatment to the theoretical foundations of digital microfluidics which will be
essential to the later discussion related to the methodology of securing these devices.

2.2. OVERVIEW OF BIOCHIP SYNTHESIS FLOW AND EXECUTION
A typical synthesis flow for digital microfluidic biochip is a process that maps a
bioassay represented as a sequencing graph into a design that consists of modules that can
execute that bioassay over time. The synthesis tool accepts as input the sequencing graph
that describes the bioassay protocol, a library of modules that can perform operations,
and design constraints. The process binds the operations of the bioassay into available
resources then handles module placement and operation scheduling. This flow is shown
in greater detail in Figure 2.4:

Figure 2.4. DMFB synthesis flow [1]
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To program the digital microfluidic biochip to perform the bioassay protocol a
sequence of electrode activations is needed. As a result of the synthesis process, the
electrode actuation sequence is produced which represents the state of each electrode at a
particular moment in time. Therefore, the sequence can be thought of as a linear,
synchronous state machine where the electrode array remains in a state for a specified
amount of time to perform a subset of the protocol’s operations as shown in Figure 2.5:

Figure 2.5. Actuation sequence and electrode states [22]

More precisely, the state machine that represents the electrode actuation sequence can be
expressed in matrix form. Using an M x N matrix, each electrode within the matrix can
be listed as 𝐸 , 𝐸 …., 𝐸

. Assuming that the completion time of the synthesis result is

in T clock cycles, the actuation sequences for all electrodes can be written as actuation
matrix, 𝒜, of the form (M x N) x T. Each element of 𝒜 contains the status of each unit
cell over time, i.e., the status of electrode 𝐸 at time j is the element in the ith column and
the jth row of 𝒜. For example, if the protocol begins with two sequential operations, a 6
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cycle mix and then a 1 cycle slit, the sub-actuation matrix in Figure 2.6 would represent
this segment of the protocol:

𝒜

𝑣 00000
⎡0𝑣 0000⎤
⎢
⎥
0 0 𝑣 0 0 0⎥
=⎢
⎢0 0 0 𝑣 0 0⎥
⎢0 0 0 0 𝑣 0⎥
⎣0 0 0 𝑣 0 𝑣 ⎦

Figure 2.6. Mix-split operation and actuation sub-matrix [1]

In Figure 2.6, 𝑣 and 𝑣 represent activated electrodes at their respective voltages for a
given operation. At each time step the electrodes are activated in a sequence that
transports the droplet from one unit cell to corresponding unit cell(s) for that operation.
The complete actuation matrix, 𝒜, can be considered a “system trace” that is comprised
of multiple submatrices that encompass the entire bioassay protocol. To further illustrate
this concept, the Figure 2.7 shows an example in tabular form of an entire system trace
for the preparation of plasmid DNA executed on a 10 x 10 array in 24 clock cycles:
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Plasmid DNA bioassay requires 3
reagents
R1 → Alkaline Lysis Solution I at 0.22%
R2 → Alkaline Lysis Solution II at 0.44%
R3 → Alkaline Lysis Solution II at 0.34%

𝒜

= (𝑀 𝑥 𝑁) 𝑥 𝑇 ∴ (10 𝑥 10)𝑥 24

Figure 2.7. Preparation of Plasmid DNA

⎯⎯⎯
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In addition to taking on an activated voltage value, the elements of the actuation matrix
can be ‘0’ or deactivated and don’t care. For clarity, don’t care elements are left blank.

2.3. ERROR RECOVERY IN CYBER-PHYSICAL DIGITAL BIOCHIPS
The presence of integrated sensors and physical-aware control software, enables
the composition of cyber-physical digital microfluidic biochips that can monitor operations
during runtime. Additionally, cyber-physical digital microfluidic biochips have the ability
to dynamically adapt to runtime errors and reconfigure in response. Reconfiguration
techniques re-compute electrode actuation sequences which produces new module
placement, droplet routing, and scheduling to adjust to a previously encountered error. To
illustrate the concept of error recovery, Figure 2.8 demonstrates an example of rollback
error-recovery which discards a faulty droplet and re-executes the operation:

Figure 2.8. (a) Initial sequence graph (b) Adjusted graph after error at operation 9 [1]
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Figure 2.8(a) shows the initial sequencing graph that describes the bioassay that will be
executed on the biochip. When the sensor detects a mixing error at an operation 9, the
rollback error recovery mechanism discards the previously mixed droplet, re-dispenses
droplets, and re-mixes. The following will introduce a method for real-time error
recovery that will be the subject of further security discussion.
Recent work has taken an additional step towards enabling adaptive LOC devices
with a novel hardware-assisted approach to error-recovery that utilizes a compact
dictionary implemented on a field-programmable gate array (FPGA). The dictionary
consists of predetermined actuation sequences needed for error-recovery which are stored
in memory. Using the proposed finite state machine control, the FPGA can transfer the
preloaded actuation sequences to the biochip as required. This error-recovery approach
shows promise for handling the highly precise time control of chemical synthesis in flash
chemistry, point-of-care field-deployment, and handheld device development. Figure 2.9
illustrates the finite state machine control system:

Figure 2.9. Finite state machine control for hardware-assisted error recovery [1]
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The outputs shown saved in memory as shown in Figure 2.9 are pre-determined recovery
actuation sequences that account for all errors of interest that may occur at runtime. If an
error is detected then the system performs a search in the compact dictionary that
corresponds to the event that occurred. This dictionary look-up approach to perform resynthesis has a faster response time that the “computer-in-the-loop” approach that relies
on external control application to execute error correction responses. Eliminating the
need for control software to execute on-line error recover also removes the requirement
of a PC and related interfaces. In addition to reducing the latency, this reduction in
hardware can increase the overall reliability of the cyber-physical system since each
component can be a point-of-failure.
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3. CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEM SECURITY FOUNDATION

3.1. SECURITY DOMAIN
The event system divides the system into multiple security domains 𝑆𝐷 as
viewed by entity i. These security domains may or may not overlap each other.

3.2. VALUATION FUNCTION
𝑉 (𝑝) is a valuation function that returns the boolean value of state variable 𝑠 in
security domain y. In this context, the valuation function assigns a truth value to p which
presents the ability of security domain y to evaluate state variable 𝑠

3.3. NONDEDUCIBILITY
Sutherland introduced the original concept of Nondeducibility (ND) [6] models
that, in terms of state transitions, restricts the flow of information within a system
between two disjoint sets, typically labeled high and low. The notion of Nondeduciblysecure in terms of these partitions means that the low level partition cannot deduce any
information about the high level. To explain this notion of security formally, the event
system definition in Figure 3.1 is needed:
S = (E, I, O, T) where
E is a set of events
𝐼 ⊆ 𝐸 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝑂 ⊆ 𝐸 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
T is the set of all possible finite sequences of legal events
Figure 3.1. Formal event system definition
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It must also be noted that the sets of High inputs and outputs have the following
respective relationship: 𝐻 ∩ 𝐼 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐻 ∩ 𝑂. Similarly, the sets of Low inputs and outputs
can be shown as follows: 𝐿 ∩ 𝐼 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐿 ∩ 𝑂. If 𝑇

is the set of possible low level events

that are legal in the system the a projection function can be defined that deletes all High
inputs from a given trace, 𝜋 : 𝑇 → 𝑇

. Nondeducibly indicates that a Low level

observer should not be able to deduce any information about the set of High inputs from a
Low level trace that belongs to set of legal Low level traces, 𝑡
given 𝑡

∈𝑇

. Therefore,

, the complete trace 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 that produced is the Low-level trace is equally likely

to be any trace that can be evaluated by the projection function. Stated more formally, a
system is deducibly secure if, for every trace 𝑡

∈𝑇

the corresponding set of High-

level traces contains every possible, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, for which 𝜋 (𝑡) = 𝑡

.

3.4. APPLICATION OF NONDEDUCIBILITY ANALYSIS
Event traces for cyber-physical digital microfluidic biochips can be generally
represented as a combination of two classes of event sequences: bioassay operation traces
and system event traces. Bioassay operation traces are the sequence of module level
operations that occur on the electrode array over time which represent a particular
protocol. These traces can be expressed as actuation sub-matrix transitions as previously
discussed in section 2.2. System event traces are the sequences of higher level operations
that facilitate a bioassay protocol with respect to software control and a particular sensing
system. For comparison, Figure 3.2 two possible event systems are given for cyberphysical biochips that utilizes optical detection and a droplet visualization detection with
error recovery respectively:
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Figure 3.2. Event system for optical and visualization detection

The complete trace set, 𝑇 , can be expressed as the collection of all possible event
sequences that occur during a bioassay execution:
𝑇 =𝑇 ∪𝑇
where 𝑇 is all possible sequences of legal system events and 𝑇 is all possible sequences
of bioassay operations that characterize the protocol.
Although under normal conditions, a bioassay protocol is described with a single
sequence of events which represent ordered operations, errors may occur which results in
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additional legal traces that are included within 𝑇 that account for error correction. Given
this formal description of the trace system for cyber-physical digital microfluidic
biochips and the system level events described in Figure 3.2, the complete trace of
plasmid DNA preparation employing optical sensing in Figure 2.7 can be expressed as
follows:
{𝐴 ⟼ 𝐴 }⋃ 𝒜

= {𝐴 ⟼ 𝐴 }⋃{(10 𝑥 10)𝑥 24}

However the shortcomings of this model are that the partitions are absolute and
simplistic. The model cannot adequately handle security domains that are overlapping or
information flows that cannot be evaluated because the model lacks the necessary
valuation functions. These restrictions, in addition to the need to control information
flow between multiple cyber and physical components of Cyber-physical systems led to
the development of the MSDND model.

3.5. MULTIPLE SECURITY DOMAIN NONDEDUCIBILITY
There exist some world with a pair of states where one must be true and the other
false (exclusive OR), but an entity i has no valuation for those states. This indicates that
in 𝑆𝐷 , entity i cannot know which state is true and which is false. This is formally stated
as the following:
𝑀𝑆𝐷𝑁𝐷 = ∃𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 ⊢ [𝑠 ⊕ 𝑠 ]⋀[𝑤 ⊨ ∄𝑉 (𝑤)⋀∄𝑉 (𝑤)]
In special case where 𝑠 is 𝜑 = 𝑇 and ¬𝜑 = 𝑇, MSDND reduces to:
𝑀𝑆𝐷𝑁𝐷 = ∃𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 ⊢ [𝑤 ⊨ (∄𝑉 (𝑤))]
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3.6. BELIEF, INFORMATION TRANSFER, AND TRUST LOGIC
Liau introduced doxastic belief, information transfer, and trust logic (BIT) [5] to
reason about belief, information transfer, and trust among cyber entities. While it was
developed primarily for handling trust in database and distributed systems, it is also
useful for describing cyber-physical systems (CPS), especially when humans are
involved. Before BIT logic was introduced social engineering attacks could only be
described by a narrative in imprecise language. BIT logic allows spoofing and other
unwanted behavior to be described with simple, formal proofs. It is designed to reason
about the belief and trust an entity i has in information from an entity j, e.g. the belief and
trust an operator has in the reading from a monitoring station.


𝑇 , 𝜑 defines the trust that i has a report from j that 𝜑is true.



𝐵 𝜑 defines the belief by i that 𝜑is true. It does not matter if 𝜑is true or not, i believes
it to be true.



𝐼 , 𝜑 defines the information transfer directly from one agent to another, that is j
has a reported to i that 𝜑is true.



𝑈 𝜑 defines the broadcast of information that φ is true by an agent j . No efforts
are made to hide the transmission although the actual message may be obscured.

These concepts are essential because the core of the doxastic proofs provided in later
sections demonstrate a violation of trust in the system.
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3.7. INVARIANTS
An invariant is a function, quantity, or property that remains unchanged when a
specified transformation is applied. An invariant is a logical predicate on a system state
that should not change its truth value if satisfied by the system execution. Recently
invariants have been used in physical power systems to ensure correct operation.
Invariants are well-understood for cyber processes but extending them into the physical
domains requires some insight. We can arrive at invariant equations based on the
physical, thermal, or chemical properties of the system which can be used as an
alternative source of information for a parameter in question.

3.8. CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEM ATTESTATION
CPS can become vulnerable to unexpected attacks without physical monitors to
verify correct operation of physical processes and interactions between the cyber control.
Vital areas where an agent trusts a report from another agent should be examined and
where possible those reports should be verified by physical measurements. CPS
attestation [10] is a method of securing a system that exploits the physical system
dynamics. This technique uses an independent verifier to continuously monitor invariants
to detect whether a component is behaving as expected or driving the system to an unsafe
state. [10] emphasizes that the verifier would need to have a physical model of the plant
and a model of the control algorithm to be able to identify false sensor or controller
signals. As applied to cyber-physical digital microfluidic systems, the verifier would
require knowledge of the bioassay protocol, i.e bioassay sequencing graph, and invariant
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relationships for attestation. More discussion on attestation and invariants is in later
sections.

3.9. APPLICATION EXAMPLE: POLYMERASE CHAIN REACTION.
Over the past decade, there have been several implementations of PCR on EWOD
devices. Polymerase chain reactions (PCR) is a well-known method for creating copies of
a certain portion of DNA for biochemical analysis. Through DNA amplification
thousands or millions of copies are made of a particular sequence. The process involves a
doubling of a segment of DNA during a single thermal cycle. If n thermal cycles are
performed, the DNA amplification factor is 2n. A PCR thermal cycle consists of three
stages:
1. Denaturation: The two strands of parent DNA are separated by heating the
solution to 95℃ for 45s.
2. Annealing: The solution is cooled to 54℃ for 30s so that each primer can
hybridize to a DNA strand.
3. Elongation: This involves heating solution to 72℃ for 90s which is optimal for
Taq polymerase, a common enzyme used for PCR amplification. It allows the Taq
DNA to attach at each priming site and extend a new DNA strand.
Droplet Position Sensing: To complete a single PCR cycle the sample must be
transported between three temperature control zones [3]. In order to achieve the desired
amplification, typically 20-35 complete cycles are required. Accurate droplet path
tracking can ensure that are cycles are fully completed. [3] provides an EWOD unit
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device model with a droplet transfer rate that is analogous to the drain current of
MOSFET devices:
(1)

𝑃 ∶= 𝑈 ≅ 𝐶 (𝑉 − 𝑉 )
where U is the mass droplet transfer rate (Hz) and 𝑉 is the threshold voltage. Using

characteristics such as this invariant together with a capacitive invariant (2) and sensing
technology [2][18] that can ensure temperature zone traversal and total number of cycles
have been completed.
𝑃 ∶= 𝐶

=𝐶

+𝐶

+𝐶

(2)

Thermal Cycle Temperature: In each stage of the of the PCR thermal cycle the
temperature must be precisely controlled. The approximate melting temperature is
calculated as:
𝑃 ∶= 𝑇

= 𝑇 − 5°𝐶

(3)

These heat invariants joined with temperature sensing gives confidence to the successful
completion of each stage of the PCR cycle.
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4. SECURITY OF DIGITAL MICROFLUIDIC BIOCHIPS

Although research investigating the security of DMFB is a new development,
presented here is a brief survey of investigation in the field. [7][8] discusses both result
manipulation attacks of enzymatic glucose assays and denial-of-service attacks through
tampering. These are the first works to fully assess vulnerabilities in DMFB and their
consequences. [14] investigates DMFB supply chain security vulnerabilities and
potential countermeasures. It explores how attackers may exploit these vulnerabilities
leading to pirating proprietary protocols, test results modification, and related impacts.
[13] proposes an authentication method that utilizes characteristics of electrodes to
generate keys for piracy prevention. [16] focuses on timing attacks and attack site
localization using symbolic reasoning. [15] proposes a method of verifying the accuracy
of signals from the online controller that uses a strategically placed droplet test circuit.
As will be discussed in future sections, the method discussed in this work differs greatly
with its predecessors because it primarily focuses on information flow disruption and
potential vulnerabilities caused by implicit belief and trust among system components.
The key difference is that the analysis proposes adopting process-based detection
mechanisms, that rely on the underlying physical and chemical properties of the process,
to secure the system.
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5. CYBER-PHYSICAL ATTESTATION APPROACH TO SECURE BIOCHIPS

The focus of this thesis is to model Stuxnet-type attacks on POC technology built
around Cyber-physical digital microfluidic systems. When evaluating the impact of such
attacks the following essential questions must be considered: Can such an attack be
detected while in progress? How can a CPS be protected from the human operator’s blind
trust in cyber monitoring? If incorrect but reasonable information is sent, how will one
know? The goal of these type of attacks is to hide critical information instead of steal it.
There are two primary ways to hide information: make it impossible to evaluate the
question 𝜑, or to disrupt the actual valuation function to return an unreliable valuation of
the question. It is bad for the system if it is MSDND secure in regard to integrity since
by the definition of MSDND the observer does not have valuation functions for the states
of the system i.e. he cannot determine which state is true and which state is false (he
cannot determine if there is any change in information). However it is good for the
system in regard to confidentiality because any observer will not be able to know any
changes made to the system. Sutherland and McLean both hint at this two-way nature of
Nondeducibility in their seminal papers. The following will discuss an attack model that
prevents the device user from knowing if the device is operating normally or is in error
recovery. Effectively, the source of the electrode array programming, i.e. original
sequencing graph or compact dictionary is unknown. In this case, the Stuxnet-type attack
has hijacked the interface between the sensors and the monitor. Such an attack or similar
may allow the attacker the necessary access to disrupt PCR temperature control.
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If a Stuxnet-type attack could be introduced to the system monitor, the virus could
disrupt the operation and accurate completion of the bioassay. For example, consider if
the FPGA that controls the actuation sequences that program the electrode array has been
corrupted. By disrupting the flow of information from this domain to the biochip,
legitimate errors that may occur during execution would not be handled correctly.
Depending upon the objectives of the attack, the pass/fail results could be modified or
contamination can be forced. Pertinent security domains are defined in Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1. Security domain definitions

Theorem 1. The state of error recovery, φ, is MSDND secure under attack within
domains SD0, SD1, and SD2 from the perspective of the monitoring domain
Proof:

φ = "The system is in error recovery"
Since 𝑆 is φ and 𝑆 is ¬φ,

1. φ = true; Error has occurred during PCR thermal cycle.
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2. w ⊨ 𝑉 (𝑤) = false; The device has entered into error recovery, but the monitor has no
valuation
3. 𝐼 , 𝜑; The integrated sensors report error to virus
4.𝐵 𝐼 , 𝜑; The virus believes the report
5. 𝑇 , 𝜑 ; The virus trusts the report
6. 𝐼 , ¬φ; The virus reports that the system is not in error recovery
7. 𝐵 𝐼 , ¬𝜑; The monitor believes the report
8. 𝑇 , ¬𝜑; The monitor trusts the report
9. 𝐵 𝐼 , ¬𝜑 ∧ 𝑇 , ¬𝜑 →𝐵 ¬φ; Monitor believes that no error has occurred.
10. ( 𝑉 (𝑤) = false ∧ (𝐵 𝐼 , 𝜑 ∧𝑇 , 𝜑)
∴ MSDND = ∀w ∈W : [w⊨(∄𝑉 (𝑤))]
Remark. In this case since there is no valuation of the proposition and no alarms were
raised, therefore the device user observing the monitor has no knowledge that an error
has occurred. The attacker uses the implicit trust in the monitoring system to introduce
MSDND into the attack and to hide the attack. This allows the attacker to disrupt the flow
of critical information. The CPS has been compromised.
To prevent this type of attack, a separate verifier that uses fundamental system
properties, as shown in Figure 5.2, is added. This verifier processes biochemical
properties discussed in previous sections to provide an independent verification of the
results of the system processing. This is formalized in the following theorem:
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Figure 5.2. Proposed independent verifier of biochemical invariants

Theorem 2. The state of error recovery, φ, is not MSDND secure when the temperature
of PCR thermal cycle is not within tight range, and operational invariants are taken into
consideration by an independent verifier in separate security domain .
Proof:

φ = "The system is in error recovery"
Since 𝑆 is φ and 𝑆 is ¬φ,

1. φ = true; Error has occurred during PCR
2. w ⊨ 𝑉 (𝑤)= false; The device has entered error recovery, but the monitor has no
valuation
3. 𝐼 , 𝜑; The integrated sensors report error to virus
4. 𝐵 𝐼 , 𝜑; The virus believes the report
5. 𝑇 , 𝜑; The virus trusts the report
6. 𝐼 , ¬φ; The virus reports that the system is not in error recovery
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7. w ⊨ 𝑉 (𝑤)= true; The verifier has valuation
8. 𝐼 , 𝜑; The integrated sensors report error to
verifier
9. 𝐵 𝐼 , 𝜑; The verifier believes report
10. 𝑇 , 𝜑; The verifier trusts the report
11. 𝑈 𝜑⋀𝐼 , 𝜑; Verifier processes invariants, establishes virus report is a lie, and
broadcasts the lie to the monitor.
12. 𝐵 𝑈 𝜑; Monitor hears and believes the broadcast.
13. 𝑇 𝑈 𝜑; Monitor trusts the broadcast
14. w ⊨ 𝑉 (𝑤)= true; Valuation now exists
∴ MSDND ≠ ∀w ∈W : ∃[w⊨(𝑉 (𝑤))]
Remark. In this case the proposition is not MSDND secure. Valuation has been
provided through attestation. The verifier processes the invariants and determines there is
an attack which raises an alarm and triggers a forensic information flow. This breaks
implicit trust in the monitoring system and leaves the attack nowhere to hide.
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A universal premise set (𝕌 ) for an entire application would include all relevant
invariant equations that would be evaluated for the bioassay on the given biochip. Each
individual operation (m) is associated with subset of premises that are evaluated by the
verifier, 𝕆 ⊂ 𝕌 . Elements of such a premise subset for a bioassay operation involved
in a polymerase chain reaction may include transfer rate for droplet tracking, specified
melting temperature range, and coplanar capacitance values as seen in equations (1) – (3),
{𝑝 , 𝑝 … 𝑝 } ∈ 𝕆 . During bioassay execution each element of 𝕆 is logically
evaluated in the event of an attack as described in step 11 of theorem 2. All member
premises must remain true to consider the system secure (tautology) or else it is
considered insecure and an alarm is raised and a beneficial flow is induced(fallacy). For
example, given a threshold voltage of 17V as stated in [3] the verifier would reference the
invariant equation describing transfer rate characteristic as seen in Figure 5.3. when
attesting if this premise has held true.

Figure 5.3. Droplet transfer rate for three distinct mediums [3]
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Such an invariant would contribute to accurately tracking the movement of the droplet
across the electrode array as assay operations are being performed. The verifier could
leverage the transfer rate characteristic to detect if a malicious agent is trying to re-direct
the droplet to perform undesired operations which could change the diagnostic result.
For example, as viewed by the verifier, a malicious transfer characteristic would appear
as if the droplet is traveling through a different medium than what is expected.
As the droplet transitions from electrode unit cell to another there is also a change
in coplanar capacitance that occurs1. When the droplet is transported to a particular cell
its total capacitance is a function of the dielectric capacitance, coplanar gap, transport
medium, and the droplet capacitance2. For accurate droplet tracking, the verifier attests
the coplanar capacitance to differentiate various liquid types that have distinct dielectric
constants. To illustrate this, Figure 5.4. shows the equivalent lumped electromechanical
circuit model for a two-plate unit cell:

Figure 5.4. Lumped electromechanical model of unit cell with droplet [24]
1

The actual coplanar capacitance may be a function of precise location of droplet over electrode, presence
of droplet overlap, transport medium, and other physical phenomena.
2
Other factors may also include electrode size and gap between adjacent unit cells. In this work a more
simplified model is considered.
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The capacitances Ct and Cpt seen in Figure 5.4 represent the capacitances of the Teflon
layer and the combined Teflon/parylene layer respectively. The parallel droplet
resistance, DropletR, and capacitance, DropletC, characterize the liquid between the
parallel plates. This resistor-capacitor (RC) relationship will affect the voltage response
seen across the droplet with the grounded electrode as a reference. Figure 5.5 exhibits
this effect for four liquids with distinct dielectric constants, kd: water (kd = 80.1),
chloroform (kd = 4.8),, acetone (kd = 21), and formamide (kd = 111) [23]:

Figure 5.5. DC transient response of circuit model with varying droplet capacitance

As can be seen in Figure 5.5, there is a divergence in transient response when the
simulated model uses a different dielectric constant that yields what can be considered a
pre-convergence window. The independent verifier will attest these data points within
this window to authenticate the actual droplet present. For example, if acetone is the
expected liquid to be detected between a unit cell at a given timestep, but the response
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seen within the attestation window closely follows formamide then the verifier would
note the distinction and detect the attack. This evaluation of the actual liquid present in
the event of an attack would break MSDND as described in step 11 of theorem 2.
In addition to differentiating liquids types within an electrode unit cell, the
verifier must also distinguish between empty and non-empty cells to facilitate droplet
tracking. This can be illustrated with a modified version of electromechanical circuit
model shown in Figure 5.6:

Figure 5.6. Lumped electromechanical model of unit cell with no droplet [24]

As in Figure 5.4, The capacitances Ct and Cpt represent the capacitances of the Teflon
layer and the combined Teflon/parylene layer respectively. Instead of a parallel RC
elements, this model includes a capacitive element, AirC, whose dielectric is ambient air.
A DC transient simulation produces the response seen in Figure 5.7:
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Figure 5.7. DC transient response of circuit model with air capacitance

Because the transient responses seen in Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.7 are quite distinct, the
verifier can distinguish between an empty and droplet-filled unit cell regardless of liquid
type by comparing the characteristics differences within the attestation window. An
attack that transitions a droplet to a unit cell that should remain vacant at a time, or viceversa, can be detected by the verifier by using the expected characteristic response.
As described in the proof, the attestation of these characteristics, droplet velocity
and the voltage-capacitance relationship, gives a valuation of the security domain that is
performing biochemical operations. In the event of an attack that attempts to hide behind
MSDND, an alarm will be raised by the independent verifier to create a beneficial
information flow path as illustrated in Figure 5.2. The verifier’s response to an attack
that violates the premises is used to enforce the security policy. This signifies a high-tolow information flow path exposing the attack attempting to hide behind implicit trust in
the device.
A high-level hardware implementation is proposed in Figure 5.8. This figure
depicts both the attempt of the attacker to alter the DMFB programming through
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manipulation of the error recovery dictionary, and the beneficial information flow paths
to the device user created the attestation of the independent verifier.

Figure 5.8. Proposed implementation of information flows in cyber-physical DMFB

34
6. CONCLUSION

As seen with SARS and COVID-19, infectious diseases outbreaks can provoke
devastating global consequences. Under these circumstances, rapid in-field diagnostic
systems are integral pieces in constructing health systems equipped with an effective first
line of defense. The necessity of such systems is compounded in low-resource settings
where access to high quality health care can be scarce or non-existent. Digital
microfluidic biochips and similar lab-on-chip systems have begun to play an important
role in transitioning diagnostics from a strictly clinical environment to patient bedside.
Given their relevance to national health, it’s important that these safety-critical systems
be protected from any malicious intent. This thesis leverages a MSDND security analysis
to model attacks on critical information paths of cyber-physical DMFB and how they can
be secured. Specifically, the attack model explored in this work is program manipulation
of a DMFB that utilizes a real-time error recovery dictionary. In this case, the attacker
compromises the operation of the system by blinding the system monitor from the true
error recovery state. Without an independent valuation of bioassay operations that occur
within the device the user is unaware that the biochip has been compromised. To address
such vulnerabilities, this thesis describes a methodology that employs an independent
verifier to attest biochemical invariants. This creates a favorable information flow path to
the user when an alarm is raised.
The proposed methodology represents the beginning of this security analysis and
invites further research. Two potential directions include: (1) First, refining the security
domains. It is not clear at this time how security domains should be constructed or how
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many there should be. Further investigation is needed to more precisely define both
borders between various security domains and which entities belong to said domains. (2)
Second, defining the independent verifier implementation. The attestation verifier
presented in this thesis is only a high-level representation. This research group is
currently investigating practical implementations that apply data centric approaches that
can be deployed on the edge LoC device. The current objective of this line of research is
to develop a verifier and attestation algorithm that will offer “intelligent, low-impact”
security overhead. Such an advance would utilize on-chip intelligent algorithms which
would result in low-impact to real-time performance for flash chemistry enablement [1],
and low-impact to overall system cost for POC deployment in low-resource settings.
These are directions for future work.
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APPENDIX

A.1.

THEORY OF ELECTROWETTING ON DIELECTRIC
The electrowetting effect, or electrowetting on dielectric (EWOD), is a key

foundational principle on which digital microfluidic biochips are built. EWOD is the
phenomena by which an applied electric field can modify the wetting behavior of a
polarizable droplet that is in contract with a hydrophobic, insulated electrode. When this
field is applied the interfacial tension between the surface and the droplet reduces which
corresponds to a change in the contact angle between them as shown in Figure A.1:

Figure A.1. The electrowetting effect

This change in contact angle allows displacement from the current position of the droplet
to the adjacent cell.
Examining Figure A.1 closer, the EWOD effect has three angular phases that are
a product of its three separate interfaces. The first phase is the solid dielectric layer, the
second phase is the droplet, the third phase is vapor or filler medium depending upon if
the droplet is in direct contact with air or a filler medium respectively. Each interface has
its interfacial energy,𝛾 , where i and j correspond to their respective phases as can be
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seen in Figure A.2. The interfacial energy is defined as “the amount of energy, G, that
must be used under reversible and isothermal conditions to increase the surface A of an
interface at constant volume”. The definition is shown in equation A1:
𝛾 =

|

,

(A1)

𝛾 = 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑣𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦
𝛾 = 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦
𝛾 = 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑣𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦

Figure A.2. Phases and their interfacial energy [1]

The energy of the droplet will reach its minimum value at its equilibrium state. By
applying the Principle of Minimum Total Energy, a correlation between droplet energy
and interfacial energy can be obtain as shown in equation A2:
= 𝛾 − 𝛾 + 𝛾 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃 = 0

(A2)

From this relationship Young equation can be derived with shows that the droplet contact
angle is related to the interfacial energies as shown in equation A3:
cos 𝜃 =

(A3)

When voltage is applied as in Figure A.1, equation A2 will receive additional terms and
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by employing Gauss’s law the droplet/interfacial correlation equation changes as shown
in equation A4:
= 𝛾 − 𝛾 + 𝛾 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃 −

𝑉 =0

(A4)

Equation A5 shows that the contact angle is now a function of the electrode voltage. This
revised relationship is known as Young-Lippman Equation where d represents the
thickness of the dielectric insulation layer and V represents the control voltage:
cos 𝜃 =

+

𝑉

(A5)

The Young-Lippman equations correlates the voltage applied to the droplet contact angle.
When no voltage is applied to the electrode the surface is hydrophobic and repels the
droplet, but when voltage is applied at the electrode the surface is hydrophilic and attracts
the droplet. These surface changes cause the droplet to move on the digital microfluidic
chip according to the applied control voltage.

A.2.

DROPLET TRANSPORT MODEL
Droplet transport is an empirically defined model that represents the balancing of

the work done by external capillary forces and transformed and dissipated energy that
occurs during actuation. The control voltage applied to the electrode causes these
external forces which induces a difference in solid/liquid interfacial tension between the
droplet and the bottom insulator.
An important component is the external force per unit length acting on the
droplet, represented by 𝐹 , which is the electrostatic energy per unit area:
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𝐹 =
where 𝜀

𝑉 −𝐹

(A6)

is the permittivity of the bottom insulator and d represents the thickness of the

insulator. The 𝐹 term represents the threshold initiation force that accounts factors such
as static friction from adsorption. It is a function of the insulator surface’s structure or a
function of the chemical interaction with the liquid. Another component of the droplet
transport model is the viscous friction force, 𝐹 , that works opposite to the direction of
the forces causing the fluid to flow:
.

𝐹 =𝐵
where 𝛾

𝛾

(A7)

is the liquid-medium interfacial tension, B is the fitting and dimensional

coefficient, U is the droplet velocity, and the remaining portion of the term is represented
by the capillary number, 𝐶 = 𝜇 𝑈⁄𝛾

. The last primary component of the droplet

transport, 𝐹 , accounts for the oil medium:
𝐹 =

+𝑠 𝜇 𝑈

(A8)

where m and s are coefficients that are used with viscous stress that account for oil
entrainment and flow, respectively. In order to fully describe the droplet velocity a final
component is introduced in the model, 𝐹 , which represents a linear friction effect to
account for dissipation:
𝐹 = 𝜁𝑈

(A9)
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where 𝜁 is the contact-line friction coefficients. The resultant droplet model that includes
previously defined physical effects equations (A6) – (A9) fully describes the transport
dynamics:

𝑉 −𝐹 =𝐵

.

𝛾

+𝐹 =

+ 𝑠 𝜇 𝑈 + 𝜁𝑈

(A10)

After extracting numerical coefficients in experimentation, a comparison can be made
between the model predication and the actual linear velocity:

Figure A.3. Linear droplet velocity vs actuation voltage

A.3.

SENSING SYSTEMS
Robust sensing systems capable of precise detection will play a vital role in

the development digital microfluidic systems. These sensing systems interact with
“physical-aware” software for continuous monitoring of biochip operations. The
control software receives information from these operations using sensor feedback
which allows the determination if each step in droplet processing has completed.
Figure A4 shows a general workflow for such sensing systems:
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Figure A.4. Physical-aware microfluidic system [1]

Current implementations of sensing systems used for biochips can be classified as
follows according to their distinct method of detection: droplet visualization
monitoring, on-chip capacitive sensing, and on-chip photo detection. Each category
will be discussed in the following subsections.
A.3.1. Droplet Visualization Monitoring
Droplet visualization monitoring systems utilize cameras to detect the
movement of droplets on the electrode array during array execution. An example
setup is shown in Figure A5:

Figure A.5. Droplet visualization system [1]
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In Figure A.5, two fixed charge-coupled device (CCD) cameras are used to capture
top and side views of the droplet. By processing images of the droplet while
executing different operations it is possible to determine if it was completed
successfully. During runtime, the control software makes the determination by
continuously comparing images at intermediate steps with reference images. For
example, the mixing of one KCl droplet with a fluorescein droplet is performed by a
series of split and merge operations. Using a CCD camera, time elapsed images are
captured and compared to detect if the mix was completed as expected:

Figure A.6. Captured images of mixing KCl and fluorescein [1]
From Figure A.6, it can be determined that the fluorescein has been uniformly
distributed throughout the merged droplet.
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Although the CCD camera sensing system allows precisely locating droplets
and verifying correction operation completion, it has the disadvantage of requiring
additional instrumentation. This can be prohibitive in resource limited settings and
non-optimal for handheld implementations. The following subsections will discuss
two integrated sensing approaches for digital microfluidic systems.
A.3.2. On-chip Capacitive Sensing
Both electrodes of a unit cell form a parallel-plate, or coplanar, capacitance
which can be used to detect droplet movement. The coplanar capacitance can be
measured by a resistor-capacitor (RC) circuit as shown in Figure A7:

Figure A.7. Coplanar capacitive sensing system [1]
The permittivity of the droplet, or its ability to store charge when under the influence
of an electric field, is different from that of the filler medium of the digital
microfluidic biochip. This difference in permittivity results in a change in coplanar
capacitance when a droplet moves towards a unit cell.
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A.3.3. On-chip Photo Detection
Optical photo detecting is additional method to detect the correct execution of
microfluidic operations on an electrode array. A fluorescein tag is added to the
droplet which emits light of different spectrums depending upon droplet
concentrations. Photodetectors are integrated into the biochip that detects the light
emission and converts it into a measurable voltage. One example of an integrated
optical sensors is a thin film InGaAs photodetector that is bonded onto a glass
platform as seen in Figure A8:

Figure A.8. Coplanar digital microfluidic biochip with integrated InGaAs thin film
photodetector [1]

These sensor readings are fed back to the control software for comparison to expected
threshold values as previously illustrated in Figure A.4.
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